Indian military operation against Sikh militants
Operation Blue Star was a military operation conducted by the Indian Armed Forces from 1 and 10 June to remove Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and other Sikh militants from the Golden Temple, Amritsar.
A long-standing movement advocating for greater political rights for the Sikh community had previously existed in the Indian state of Punjab, and in , Sikh activists presented the Indian government with the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, a list of demands for greater autonomy for Punjab. The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. In July , Harchand Singh Longowal, the president of the Sikh political party Shiromani Akali Dal, invited Bhindranwale, who was wanted by authorities, to take up residence in the Golden Temple to evade arrest.[25]:&#;&#;[26] Bhindranwale had organized killer squads to eliminate supposed enemies of Sikhism.[27] From the Harmandir Sahib complex, Bhindranwale orchestrated militants to kill hundreds of Hindus, and used terrorism to evoke fear among Hindus, hoping to incite their mass flight from Punjab.[28][29][30] On 1 June , after negotiations with the militants failed, Indian prime ministerIndira Gandhi ordered the army to launch Operation Blue Star in haste, attacking the Golden Temple and scores of other Sikh temples and sites across Punjab which included killing civilians and devotees too.[31]
The military underestimated the firepower possessed by the Sikh militants, whose armaments included Chinese-made rocket-propelled grenade launchers and ammunition with armour-piercing capabilities. Hoping to avoid damage to the holy site, Indian forces unsuccessfully assaulted the temple using light weaponry and quickly resorted to using heavy weapons, including tanks, helicopters and artillery to dislodge the well-fortified Sikh militants. Combat devolved into protracted urban warfare, with the Indian forces committing significant forces to slowly gain ground. Eventually, the Sikh militants ran out of most of their ammunition on 6 June, and by 10 June fighting had largely ceased, with the Indian forces in control of the complex. The Indian government attributed high civilian casualties to Sikh militants using pilgrims trapped inside the temple as human shields.[32] However, Indian forces were aware that civilians were present inside, and the operation began on a Sikh religious day, the martyrdom day of Guru Arjan Dev, when many worshippers would be present. Many civilians were subject to extrajudicial killings by the military during the operation.[33][34][35][36][37]
The operation drew condemnation from Sikhs worldwide and five months later, on 31 October , Indira Gandhi was assassinated in retaliation by two of her Sikh bodyguards, Satwant Singh and Beant Singh. In the aftermath, figures of her party, the Indian National Congress, and Hindu nationalist mobs orchestrated the Sikh massacre that resulted in over 5, deaths and the destruction of 40 historic gurdwaras. These events precipitated the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, calling for a separate state of Khalistan. The temple would later be raided twice more as part of Operation Black Thunder in the late s, after which Khalistani figures began to flee India.
In the years leading up to the operation, there was a significant build-up in agitation for greater autonomy for the Sikh community. Economic and social pressures driven by the Green Revolution led many young Sikh men to support varying degrees of self-determination for Sikhs and Punjab, with many even advocating independence from India.
The introduction of mechanised agricultural techniques led to uneven distribution of wealth in Punjab. Industrial development did not occur at the same pace of agricultural development in Punjab, as the Indian government was reluctant to set up heavy industries in Punjab due to its status as a high-risk border state with Pakistan.[38] Meanwhile, a rapid increase in higher education opportunities without adequate rise in jobs resulted in an increase in unemployment among educated youth.[39] The resulting unemployed young Sikhs were drawn to militant groups, which formed the backbone of increasing militancy.[40]
In the s, the Akali Dal party launched the Punjabi Suba movement, demanding a new state within India with a majority of Punjabi speaking people, out of undivided East Punjab under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh.[41] This movement resulted in fraught relations with the union government, and the Golden Temple, the holiest site in Sikhism, was raided in , and many of the movement's leaders were arrested. In , after negotiations, the present Punjab state with a Sikh majority was formed. The Akali Dal came to power in the new Punjab state in March ,[42] but early governments didn't last long due to internal conflicts and power struggles within the party. Later, the party strengthened and party governments completed their full term and eventually came to play a major role in the developments to come.
After being routed in the Punjab election, the Akali Dal put forward the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in to demand more autonomy to Punjab.[43] The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. Activist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale then joined the Akali Dal, and launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha movement in , in a bid to urge the Indian government to implement the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.[44]
Following the events of the Sikh-Nirankari clashes and the Dharam Yudh Morcha, Bhindranwale had risen to prominence in Sikh political circles with his policy of getting the Anandpur Resolution passed, failing which he wanted to declare a separate country of Khalistan as a homeland for Sikhs.[45] The resolution declared its goals within the context of remaining within the federal union of India, and leaving the powers of foreign relations, defence, currency, and general communications subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian central government. Harchand Singh Longwal, the leader of the Akali Dal, stated, "[let] us make it clear once and for all that the Sikhs have no designs to get away from India in any manner. What they simply want is that they should be allowed to live within India as Sikhs, free from all direct and indirect interference and tampering with their religious way of life. Undoubtedly, the Sikhs have the same nationality as other Indians."[46] Nonetheless, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, viewed the Anandpur Sahib Resolution as a secessionist document.[47]
The reluctance of the central government to deescalate the situation or offer major concessions has often been attributed to foreign influence. In the early s, one of the main aims of SovietKGBactive measures with regards to India was to manufacture evidence that the CIA and Pakistani intelligence were behind the growth of Sikh separatism in Punjab.[48] In , the Soviets launched Operation Kontakt, which was centered around a forged document purporting to contain details of the weapons and money provided by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to Sikh militants who wanted to create an independent country.[48] According to agent reports, the level of anxiety in the Indian embassy in Islamabad regarding Pakistani support for Sikh separatists indicated that Operation Kontakt was successfully achieving its goals of creating an alarmist effect.[48]
The Soviets used a new recruit in the New Delhi residency named "Agent S" who was close to Indira Gandhi as a major channel for providing her misleading information.[48] Agent S provided Indira Gandhi with false documents purporting to show Pakistani involvement in the Khalistan conspiracy.[48] In November , Yuri Andropov, the leader of the Soviet Union, approved a proposal to fabricate Pakistani intelligence documents detailing ISI plans to foment religious disturbances in Punjab and promote the creation of Khalistan as an independent Sikh state.[49] The KGB became confident that it could continue to deceive Indira Gandhi indefinitely with fabricated reports of CIA and Pakistani conspiracies against her.[49] The Soviets persuaded Rajiv Gandhi during a visit to Moscow in that the CIA was engaged in subversion in the Punjab.[49] When Rajiv Gandhi returned to India, he declared this to be true.[49] Indira Gandhi's decision to move troops into the Punjab was based on her taking seriously the disinformation provided by the Soviets regarding secret CIA support for the Sikhs.[50]
In , Christopher Andrew concluded that the KGB was ultimately responsible for Indira Gandhi and others in the central government exaggerating the threats posed by the Sikh militants, Pakistan, and the CIA.[50] The KGB role in facilitating Operation Blue Star was acknowledged by Subramanian Swamy in , who stated,
[the] Operation Bluestar became necessary because of the vast disinformation against Sant Bhindranwale by the KGB, and repeated inside Parliament by the Congress Party of India.[51]
In addition to Soviet influence, India was also aware of actual Pakistani influence and armament operations among the Sikh militants. According to anthropologist Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, Kashmiri fighters were present in the Golden Temple complex in ; both the Punjab and Kashmir insurgencies shared links with the Pakistan secret service whose aegis provided arms and training.[52]
Following the clashes, Bhindranwale's followers had begun keeping firearms and fortified the gurdwara that served as the headquarters of the Damdami Taksal religious center.[53]
In July , Harchand Singh Longowal invited Bhindranwale to take up residence in the Golden Temple complex. He called Bhindranwale "our stave to beat the government".[25]:&#;&#; On 19 July , Bhindranwale and approximately armed militants occupied the Guru Nanak Niwas, a guest house for pilgrims,[54] within the precincts of the Golden Temple complex. Bhindranwale had effectively made the complex his headquarters.[53] From there he met and was interviewed by international television crews.[55]
On 23 April , Punjab Police Deputy Inspector GeneralA. S. Atwal was shot dead by a gunman in the complex as he left the complex.[56] The following day, Longowal accused Bhindranwale of involvement in the murder.[57][58] The Punjab Assembly noted that the murder in the temple premises confirmed the charges that the extremists were being sheltered and given active support in religious buildings around the Golden Temple complex, especially the Guru Nanak Niwas.[59]:&#;&#;[58] After the murder of six Hindu bus passengers in the Dhilwan Bus Massacre, President's rule was imposed in Punjab state.[60] This led to increasing communal tension between Sikhs and Hindus as Hindu mobs in Karnal, Haryana murdered 8 Sikhs and set fire to a gurdwara on 19 February [61]
During debate in the Parliament of India members of both houses demanded the arrest of Bhindranwale. Sensing a prospect of his arrest from the hostel premises, he convinced SGPC president Tohra to set up his headquarter in Akal Takht (a shrine representing the temporal power of God) in the Golden Temple.[59]:&#;&#; The temple high priest protested this move as a sacrilege since no Guru or leader ever resided in the Akal Takht on the floor above Granth Sahib, but Tohra agreed to Bhindranwale's demand to prevent his arrest.[59]:&#;&#; On 15 December , Bhindranwale was asked to move out of Guru Nanak Niwas house by members of the Babbar Khalsa, who opposed Bhindranwale,[62] who acted with Longowal's support. Longowal by now feared for his own safety.[63] Tohra convinced the high priest to allow Bhindranwale to reside on the first floor of Akal Takht, as he had nowhere to go to avoid arrest.[59]:&#;&#; He said that he had to move to Akal Takht as Morcha director Longowal was negotiating with the government for his arrest.[59]:&#;&#; The government said Bhindranwale and his followers had made the Golden Temple complex an armoury[64] and headquarters,[63][verification needed] though amassing arms and usage as a base for waging war was part of the tradition of most historical gurdwaras, which display weapons caches used by the Gurus, depicting the centrality of Sikh sites to their struggles.[65]
A few leaders raised their voice against Bhindranwale in the Akal Takht complex and other gurdwaras across the state.[clarification needed] Among the prominent ones was Giani Partap Singh, a spiritual leader and former Jathedar of the Akal Takht, who criticized Bhindranwale for keeping guns in the Akal Takht. Partap was later killed along with other dissenters including Harbans Singh Manchanda, the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee president,[66] Niranjan Singh, the Granthi of Gurudwara Toot Sahib, Granthi Jarnail Singh of Valtoha and Granthi Surat Singh of Majauli.[citation needed]
The militants were able to claim safe haven in the Golden Temple due to the whole or partial support received by them from key Sikh religious leaders and institutions such as the SGPC, AISSF and Jathedar (head) of the Akal Takht. The support was either voluntary or forced by using violence or threat of violence.[65]
In January , India's secret service Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) prepared a covert plan codenamed Operation Sundown involving special forces to abduct Bhindranwale from the Golden Temple complex.[67] A RAW unit was formed to rehearse Operation Sundown in the Sarsawa Air Force Base in Uttar Pradesh, but the operation never materialized due to Indira Gandhi's rejection.
The government sent a team led by Narasimha Rao to try to convince Bhindranwale to back out, but he was adamant.[68][69] The negotiations failed and the law and order situation in Punjab continued to deteriorate.[68] Indira Gandhi tried to persuade the Akalis to support her in the arrest of Bhindranwale peacefully. These talks ended up being futile.[68] In the days before the assault, government representatives met with Bhindranwale in a last ditch effort to negotiate a truce. The Sikhs would withdraw, believing they had seen a commando unit move into the city.[70] Bhindranwale warned of a backlash by the Sikh community in the event of an armed assault on the Golden Temple.[71] On 26 May, Tohra informed the government that he had failed to get Bhindranwale to agree to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and that Bhindranwale was no longer under anyone's control.[72] Faced with imminent army action and with Harchand Singh Longowal abandoning him, Bhindranwale declared, "This bird is alone. There are many hunters after it."[72] In his final interview to Subhash Kirpekar, Bhindranwale stated that Sikhs can neither live in India nor with India.[59]:&#;&#;
Indira Gandhi then gave her permission to initiate Operation Blue Star on the recommendation of Army ChiefArun Shridhar Vaidya. She was apparently led to believe and had assumed that the operation would not involve any civilian casualties.[73] The assumption was that, when confronted, Bhindranwale would surrender to the army.[59]
An arsenal had been created within the Akal Takht over a period of several months. It was reported that trucks engaged for kar seva (religious service) and bringing in supplies for the daily langar were smuggling in guns and ammunition. The police never attempted to check these vehicles entering the Golden Temple,[weasel&#;words] on instructions from superiors. During a random check one such truck was stopped and many Sten guns and ammunition were found. The Indian government White Paper alleged that after Operation Blue Star it was found that the militants had set up a grenade manufacturing facility, and a workshop for the fabrication of Sten guns inside the Temple Complex.[74] However, the allegations of the militants being in possession of weapon workshops was never made prior to Operation Blue Star, and only after, with only the Army making these statements.[75] The statements of multiple civilian eyewitnesses instead were consistent that the militants were a small number of men and had limited arms that were used sparingly.[75]
The Harmandir Sahib compound and some of the surrounding houses were fortified under the guidance of Major General Shabeg Singh, who had joined Bhindranwale's group after dismissal from the army. During their occupation of Akal Takht, Bhindranwale's group had begun fortifying the building. The Statesman reported that light machine guns and semi-automatic rifles were known to have been brought into the compound,[76] and strategically placed to defend against an armed assault on the complex. The modern weapons later found inside the temple complex indicated that foreign elements were involved. The heavier weapons were found to have Pakistani or Chinese markings on them.[77] According to Lt. General J.S. Arora only 60 self-loading riles were foreign made. The rest were Indian. He also said that there were no medium machine guns and only two RPGs. Arora says that the arsenal was not truly sophisticated.[78]:&#;55&#; A Lt. Colonel part of the Operation later revealed that militants only had 4 light machine gun magazines. According to him a single light machine gun carries 12 magazines. He revealed that the main gun that was kept and used by militants was AKs.[78]:&#;55–56&#;
Holes were smashed through the marble walls of Akal takht to create gun positions. Walls were broken to allow entry points to the tiled courtyards. Secure machine gun nests were created. All of these positions were protected by sandbags and newly made brick walls. The windows and arches of Akal Takht were blocked with bricks and sandbags. Sandbags were placed on the turrets. Every strategically significant building of the temple complex, apart from the Harmandir Sahib in the center, had been fortified in a similar manner and allegedly defaced. The fortifications also included seventeen private houses in the residential area near the Temple.[citation needed] All the high rise buildings and towers near the temple complex were occupied. The militants manning these vantage points were in wireless contact with Shabeg Singh in Akal Takht.[79][59]:&#;&#; Under the military leadership of Major General Singh, ex-army veterans and deserters had trained Bhindranwale's men.[citation needed]
The militants in the complex were anticipating an attack by government troops. The defences in the complex were created with the purpose of stalling an assault, giving time to provoke Sikhs in the villages and encourage them to march en masse towards the Golden Temple in support of the militants. Sufficient food to last a month was stocked in the complex.[79][80]
During this period police and security forces stationed around the temple complex were allowed only within yards. This was to avoid the 'desecration' of the temple by their presence. The security forces were prevented by the politicians from taking action in enforcing the law. Even self-defence from the militants was made difficult. On 14 February , a police post near the entrance of the Temple was attacked by a group of militants. Six fully armed policemen were captured and taken inside. After twenty four hours the police responded and sent in a senior police officer for negotiation. He asked Bhindranwale to release his men, along with their weapons. Bhindranwale agreed and delivered the dead body of one of the hostages who had been killed. Later the remaining five policemen were released alive, but their weapons were kept.[59]:&#;&#;
The fortifications of the temple denied the army the possibility of commando operations. The buildings were close together and had labyrinthine passages all under the control of the militants. Militants in the temple premises had access to langars, food supplies, and water from the Sarovar (temple pond). Militants were well stocked with weapons and ammunition. Any siege under these circumstances would have been long and difficult. The option of laying down a long siege was ruled out by the army due to the risk of emotionally aroused villagers marching to the temple and clashing with the army. The negotiated settlement had already been rejected by Bhindranwale and the government decided to raid the temple.[59]:&#;&#;
Main article: Punjab insurgency
Police methods normally used on common criminals were used on protesters during the Dharam Yudh Morcha, creating state repression affecting a very large segment of Punjab's population#. Retaliatory violence came from a section of the Sikh population, widening the scope of the conflict and creating fresh motives for Sikh youth to turn to insurgency. The concept of Khalistan was still vague even while the complex was fortified under the influence of former Sikh army officials alienated by government actions who now advised Bhindranwale, Major General Shabeg Singh and retired Major General and Brigadier Mohinder Singh, and at that point the concept was still not directly connected with the movement he headed. In other parts of Punjab, a "state of chaos and repressive police methods" combined to create "a mood of overwhelming anger and resentment in the Sikh masses against the authorities", making Bhindranwale even more popular, and demands of independence gain currency, even amongst moderates and Sikh intellectuals.
On 12 May , Ramesh Chander, son of Lala Jagat Narain and editor of media house Hind Samachar group, was murdered by pro-Bhindranwale militants. In addition, seven editors and seven news hawkers and newsagents were killed in a planned attack on the freedom of media house, to cripple it financially. Punjab Police had to provide protection for the entire distribution staff.[82]
Violent incidents including arson, bombings, and shootings increased over the following months.[83] The total number of deaths was in violent incidents and riots, and 1, people were injured.[59]:&#;&#;
The government never provided evidence of the supposedly planned massacre of Hindus that triggered Operation Blue Star, although the pace of attacks was increasing.[59]:&#;&#; Congress member of parliament Amarjit Kaur, who referred to the Akali Dal as "the enemy within" and who had opposed the creation of the Punjabi Suba, alleged that Bhindranwale wanted to start a civil war between Hindus and Sikhs.[35] Meanwhile, the number of killings had been rising all over the state, with sometimes more than a dozen a day.[citation needed] On 2 June in the last 24 hours before the announcement of the operation 23&#;people were killed.[59]:&#;&#;
In June , the army was called out to help the civil administration in Punjab in response to a request from the Punjab Governor, B. D. Pande, "in view of the escalating violence by terrorists in Punjab."[84] On 2 June Operation Blue Star was initiated to flush out the militants from the Golden Temple.[59]:&#;&#;
The Khalistanis had started the movement to drive Hindus out of certain areas to make way for Sikhs coming in from other states. Due to the increased incidents of religious violence, an exchange of population had already started in Punjab. New Khalistani currency was being printed and distributed.[32] By May , the establishment of an independent Khalistan seemed imminent, as the Indian government had "received intelligence" that Pakistan had been supporting the militants with arms and money, and if Khalistan declared its independence there was the risk of Pakistan recognizing the new country and sending the Pakistani Army into Indian Punjab to protect it.[32] However, the Indian government had been the target of disinformation by the Russian KGB intelligence agency, which had sought to implicate Pakistans' Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the Khalistan movement by spreading forged documents and reports to the Indian government.[48]
According to the then-Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Srinivas Kumar Sinha the army had begun preparations for an attack on the Golden Temple 18 months prior.[86] Two months prior to the Operation the Air Force had helicopters flying above the temple taking photographs. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) had surrounded the temple two months prior to the Operation.[78]:&#;65&#;
Operation Blue Star was launched to remove Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his followers who had sought cover in the Amritsar Harmandir Sahib Complex.
On 3 June, a hour curfew was imposed on the state of Punjab with all methods of communication and public travel suspended.[2]:&#;54&#; The electricity supply was also interrupted, creating a total blackout and cutting off the state from the rest of the world. Complete media censorship was enforced.[2]:&#;81–82&#;
The army stormed Harmandir Sahib on the night of 5&#;June under the command of Major-General Kuldip Singh Brar. The forces had full control of Harmandir Sahib by the morning of 7&#;June. There were casualties among the army, civilians, and militants. Sikh leaders Bhindranwale and Shabeg Singh were killed in the operation.[87]
The armed Sikhs within the Harmandir Sahib were led by Bhindranwale, former Maj. Gen. Shabeg Singh, and Amrik Singh, the President of the All India Sikh Students Federation from Damdami Taksal.
General Arun Shridhar Vaidya was the Chief of the Indian Army. Lt. Gen. Krishaswamy Sundarji, GOC Western Command, planned and coordinated Operation Blue Star.[88] From the Indian Army Maj. Gen. Kuldip Singh Brar had command of the operation. On 31 May he had been summoned from Meerut and asked to lead the operation to remove the militants from the temple. Brar was a Jat Sikh, the same caste as Bhindranwale, and was also acquainted with Shabeg Singh, having been his student at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun.[79] Among the six generals leading the operation, four were Sikhs.[89]:&#;&#;
The army operation was further subdivided along two subcategories:[90]
In addition, the army carried out Operation Woodrose, in which units were deployed to the border areas, replacing the pickets routinely held by the paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF). The border pickets were held in at least company strength.[90]
On 1 June the Indian security forces fired into various buildings with the goal of assessing the training of the militants.[13][91] Eyewitness testimony of pilgrims inside the temple complex state that the Harmandir Sahib was fired on initially by security forces on 1&#;June and not 5&#;June as reported by the army. [91] The firing began at about &#;pm and went until about &#;pm It was by the CRPF and they used medium machine guns, light machine guns and rifles.[92] It resulted in the main shrine of the Golden Temple sustaining 34 bullet holes.[13] The action claimed the lives of eight pilgrims, including a woman and a child, inside the temple complex and injured 25 others.[13] Devinder Singh Duggal, who was in-charge of the Sikh Reference Library located inside of the Temple complex and an eye-witness to Operation Blue Star, stated that the militants were given instructions to not fire until the army or security forces entered the temple.[13][93] Duggal stated, "when I heard in the news bulletin that there was unprovoked firing from inside the Temple, but that the security forces showed extreme restrain and did not fire a single shot, I was surprised at this naked lie."[93] The deaths of at least three of the pilgrims was confirmed by the eyewitness testimony of a female Sikh student who had dressed their wounds and who later witnessed their deaths in Guru Nanak Nivas.[93] According to Kirpal Singh eleven were killed in the shooting.[92] Furthermore, Duggal stated that on 2 June a BBC team, including journalist Mark Tully, were taken around the Temple and shown 34 holes, some of them as big as three inches in diameter, caused by the bullets on all sides of the temple.[94] Tully noted, "The CRPF firing took place four days before the army actually entered the Temple."[94]
The army had already sealed the international border from Kashmir to Ganga Nagar, Rajasthan. At least seven divisions of troops were deployed in villages of Punjab. The soldiers began taking control of the city of Amritsar from the paramilitary. A young Sikh officer posing as a pilgrim was sent in to reconnoitre the temple. He spent an hour in the complex noting defensive preparations. Plans were made to clear vantage points occupied by militants outside the complex before the main assault. Patrols were also sent to study these locations.[79]
As the Indian army was sealing off exits out of Amritsar, it continued to allow pilgrims to enter the temple complex.[95] All outgoing trains from Amritsar had left by noon and other trains were cancelled.[95] The CRPF outside the temple had been replaced by the army who were taking into custody any visitors leaving the temple.[95] A pilgrim who survived the assault stated that he did not leave the temple because of the detention of visitors by the army.[95]
By nightfall media and the press were gagged and rail, road and air services in Punjab were suspended. Foreigners and non-resident Indians were denied entry. General Gauri Shankar was appointed as security advisor to the Governor of Punjab. The water and electricity supply was cut off.[96][63][97]
According to an All Sikhs Student Federation member, 10, people had come from outside including many women and 4, of them were young people.[95] The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee estimates that approximately 10, to 15, pilgrims had come from Punjab's cities and villages to attend the Gurparab.[34] Along with the pilgrims were 1, Akali workers led by Jathedar Nachattar Singh who had come to participate in the Dharam Yudh Morcha and to court arrest.[98][35] The Akali jathas who were also present consisted of about women, 18 children and about 1, men and were also forced to stay inside the temple complex.[95][35] Those who were inside were not allowed to go out after pm on 3&#;June because of the curfew placed by the military.[95]
In addition, as of 3&#;June the pilgrims who had entered the temple in the days prior were unaware that Punjab had been placed under curfew.[98] Thousands of pilgrims and hundreds of Akali workers had been allowed to collect inside the Temple complex without any warning either of the sudden curfew or imminent Army attack.[98]
In the night the curfew was re-imposed with the army and para-military patrolling all of Punjab. The army sealed off all routes of ingress and exit around the temple complex.[59]:&#;&#;
Army units led by Indian Army Lt. Gen Kuldip Singh Brar surrounded the temple complex on 3&#;June Just before the commencement of the operation, Lt. Gen Brar addressed the soldiers:
The action is not against the Sikhs or the Sikh religion; it is against terrorism. If there is anyone amongst them, who have strong religious sentiments or other reservations, and do not wish to take part in the operation he can opt out, and it will not be held against him.
—&#;Kuldip Singh Brar, [99]
However, no one opted out and that included many "Sikh officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks".[99]
On 4 and 5 June, messages asking pilgrims to leave the temple were played over loudspeakers.[79] However, in the Amritsar District and Sessions Judge Gurbir Singh gave a ruling in which he stated: "There is no evidence that army made any announcements asking ordinary civilians to leave Golden Temple complex before launching the operation in There is no written record of any public announcement by the civil authorities requesting the people to come out of the complex. No log of vehicle used for making such announcements is thereThe event underlines the human rights violations by troops during the operation."[][] The lack of evidence of any warning to vacate the temple complex was the basis of a compensatory award given to Sikhs who had been illegally detained by the Indian military.[] The army began bombarding the historic Ramgarhia Bunga, the water tank, and other fortified positions with Ordnance QF pounder artillery. After destroying the outer defences laid by Shabeg Singh, the army moved tanks and armoured personnel carrier (APCs) onto the road separating the Guru Nanak Niwas building.[]
The army helicopters spotted the massive movements, and General Krishnaswamy Sundarji sent tanks and APCs to meet them.[]
The accounts of survivors inside of the temple complex were consistent with the military commencing its assault in the early morning of June 4.[98] Duggal states that the army attack started at am with a pounder that fell in the ramparts of the Deori to the left of the Akal Takht Sahib.[98] Duggal further states that during the assault he saw a number of dead bodies of children and women in the Parikrama.[98] The army's assault had prevented Duggal from leaving the room in which he had taken shelter as he believed it would have resulted in his death.[98] Another eyewitness, Bhan Singh the Secretary of the SGPC, states that the army provided no warning of the start of the attack which prevented pilgrims and those who came as a part of the Dharam Yudh Morcha from exiting.[] A female survivor recalled that it was not until the army began using explosives on the temple that they were aware that it had commenced its assault.[] She further stated that within the Harmandir Sahib, there were some granthis (priests), ragis (singers), sevadars (service volunteers) and yatris (pilgrims) but no armed militants.[] Prithpal Singh, the sevadar on duty at the Akal rest house which housed pilgrims, stated that it was shelled by the military.[] As of May during the recording of Prithpal's account, the Akal Rest house still bore the bullet marks caused by the Indian Army.[]
On 5 June the blind head Ragi of the Harmandir Sahib Amrik Singh and Ragi Avtar Singh, were struck by bullets inside of the Harmandir Sahib by the Indian army.[] The army's targeting of the Harmandir Sahib with bullets was in contrast to the alleged restraint stated in the army issued White Paper on 10 July [] As of 5 June pilgrims who had reached the temple on 3 June were still present hiding in rooms.[] In one room 40–50 persons were huddled together, including a six-month-old child, during the army's assault.[] A female survivor of the assault stated that the army asked people to leave their hiding spots and guaranteed safe passage and water; she recalled seeing the dead bodies of pilgrims who answered the announcements lying in the Parikrama the next morning.[]
In the morning, shelling started on the building inside the Harmandir Sahib complex.[] The 9th division launched a frontal attack on the Akal Takht, although it was unable to secure the building. The Golden Temple complex had honeycombed tunnel structures.[]
pm
The BSF and CRPF attacked Hotel Temple View and Brahm Boota Akhara, respectively, on the southwest fringes of the complex. By pm both the structures were under their control.[2]:&#;81–82&#; The army simultaneously attacked various other gurdwaras. Sources mention either 42 or 74 locations.[]
pm – am
Late in the evening, the generals decided to launch a simultaneous attack from three sides. Ten Guards, 1 Para Commandos and Special Frontier Force (SFF) would attack from the main entrance of the complex, and 26 Madras and 9 Kumaon battalions from the hostel complex side entrance from the south. The objective of the 10 Guards was to secure the northern wing of the Temple complex and draw attention away from the SFF who were to secure the western wing of the complex and 1 Para Commandos who were to gain a foothold in Akal Takht and in Harmandir Sahab, with the help of divers. 26 Madras was tasked with securing the southern and the eastern complexes, and the 9 Kumaon regiment with SGPC building and Guru Ramdas Serai. Twelve Bihar was charged with providing a cordon and fire support to the other regiments by neutralising enemy positions under their observance.[2]:&#;61&#;
An initial attempt by the commandos to gain a foothold at Darshani Deori failed as they came under devastating fire, after which several further attempts were made with varying degrees of success. Eventually, other teams managed to reach Darshani Deori, a building north of the Nishan Sahib, and started to fire at the Akal Takth and a red building towards its left, so that the SFF troops could get closer to the Darshani Deori and fire gas canisters at Akal Takth. The canisters bounced off the building and affected the troops instead.
Meanwhile, 26 Madras and 9 Garhwal Rifles (reserve troops) had come under heavy fire from the Langar rooftop, Guru Ramdas Serai and the buildings in the vicinity. Moreover, they took a lot of time in forcing open the heavy Southern Gate, which had to be shot open with tank fire. This delay caused a lot of casualties among the Indian troops fighting inside the complex. Three tanks and an APC had entered the complex.
Crawling was impossible as Shabeg Singh had placed light machine guns nine or ten inches above the ground. The attempt caused many casualties among the Indian troops. A third attempt to gain the Pool was made by a squad of commandos. On the southern side, the Madras and Garhwal battalions were not able to make it to the pavement around the pool because they were engaged by positions on the southern side.
Despite the mounting casualties, General Sunderji ordered a fourth assault by the commandos. This time, the Madras battalion was reinforced with two more companies of the 7th Garhwal Rifles under the command of General Kuldip Singh Brar. However, the Madras and Garhwal troops under Brigadier A. K. Dewan once again failed to move towards the parikarma (the pavement around the pool).
Brigadier Dewan reported heavy casualties and requested more reinforcements. General Brar sent two companies of 15 Kumaon Regiment. This resulted in yet more heavy casualties, forcing Brigadier Dewan to request tank support. As one APC inched closer to the Akal Takth it was hit with an anti-tank RPG, which immediately immobilized it. Brar also requested tank support. The tanks received the clearance to fire their main guns (&#;mm high-explosive squash head shells) only at around &#;am.[2]:&#;81–&#;
According to Giani Puran Singh, a priest in Harimander Sahib, at pm tanks began entering the temple complex. At the same time armored carriers began entering to.[9]:&#;75&#;
At am the "vigerous" battle ended. In the battle about 40–50 Sikh fought the army continuously until they died or ran out of ammunition. Once this battle ended the army gained control of Darshani Deori, Clock Tower, and Atta Mandi.[9]:&#;75&#;
Vijayanta tanks shelled the Akal Takht. It suffered some damage, but the structure was still standing.[] The Special Group, a confidential special forces unit of the R&AW, began its planned raid on this day.[]
The army entered the Akal Takht. Dead bodies of Bhindranwale, Shabeg Singh and Amrik Singh were discovered in the building.[] Few surviving snipers who had managed to hold off the army for 3 days were killed.[9]:&#;90&#; At noon the army burned down the Sikh Reference Library. The library contained numerous artefacts and contained letters signed by the Sikh gurus.[9]:&#;90&#;
According to Giani Puran Singh, a Granthi of the Golden Temple, on June 7 at Ramgharia Bunga 4 Sikh held out at a trench they had dug. Giani Puran Singh was told by soldier to negotiate with them, but they pledged to die there. They killed multiple soldiers. The army failed to fight the Sikh so they attempted bombing them, but the Sikh still held out. They were eventually drawn out with chemical gas and were killed on June []
President Zail Singh visited the temple premises after the operation, while making the round, he was shot at by a sniper from one of the buildings that the army had not yet cleared. The bullet hit the arm of an army colonel who led a Commando battalion. He was accompanying the president. On June 8, he was shot by the Sikh held out in Ramgharia Bunga.[]:&#;&#;[][]
The Sikh held out were Major Singh Nagoke, Dalbir Singh, Swaran Singh Rode, Ram Singh Sultanpuri, and Nand Singh Patti.[]
The Indian army initially placed total casualties at[79] Sikh militants and civilians dead,[16] and 83 killed (4 officers, 79 soldiers) and wounded among government forces. Kuldip Nayar cites Rajiv Gandhi as allegedly admitting that nearly soldiers were killed.[19] This number was allegedly disclosed by Gandhi in September as he was addressing the National Student Union of India session in Nagpur.[15]:&#;96&#; Per Ved Marwah the army suffered 35% casualties.[][78]:&#;96&#;
According to a close associate of Bhindranwale only 35 militants were killed with the rest leaving in the early days of the Operation. They left because of a plan devised in which they would launch a revolution against the state to form Khalistan so the movement may live on. The belief of the militants was that it is better for some to live to fight another day. According to the associate all who left would die in the Punjab Insurgency.[]
Independent casualty figures were much higher.[24] Bhindranwale and large number of his militants were killed. There were high civilian casualties as well, which the Indian government argued were due to Sikhs in the Golden Temple using pilgrims trapped inside the temple as human shields,[32] though the operation was conducted at a time when the Golden Temple was packed to capacity with pilgrims who were there to celebrate the annual martyrdom anniversary of Guru Arjan Dev, the fifth Guru of the Sikhs. The pilgrims were not allowed by the militants to escape from the temple premises in spite of relaxation in the curfew hours by the security forces.[59] According to Indian army generals, "it is possible" that militants were "depending upon the Sikh masses to form a human shield to prevent action by the army", as well as the presence of a "whole lot of moderate Akali leadership".
Delivering the findings of a review in , U.K. Foreign SecretaryWilliam Hague attributed high civilian casualties to the Indian Government's attempt at a full frontal assault on the militants, diverging from the recommendations provided by the U.K. Military.[][] The Indian military had created a situation where civilians were allowed to collect inside of the temple complex. On 3 June the Indian military allowed pilgrims to enter the temple complex.[95] The Indian military also allowed thousands of protestors whom were a part of the Dharam Yudh Morcha to enter the temple complex.[95] These protestors included women and children.[95] There was no warning provided to the pilgrims who entered on 3 June that a curfew was put in place by the military.[95] These pilgrims were prevented from leaving after the curfew had been placed by the army at approximately pm.[95]
On 4 June no warning was provided to the pilgrims to evacuate and the pilgrims were deterred of leaving as the Indian army would arrest anyone who left the temple complex.[91] Although officially the army stated that it made announcements, the eyewitness testimony of pilgrims who were arrested after the assault was used as the basis of a decision in the Amritsar district court in April , which held that the army made no such announcements.[] The eyewitness testimony of survivors of the army's assault on the temple complex were consistent with stating that they were unaware of the start of the attack by the army until it took place without notice on the morning of 4 June.[98]
On 6 June the Indian military detained surviving pilgrims on the grounds that they were affiliated with the militants and subjected them to interrogations, beatings and executions.[]
Sikhs throughout the world widely condemned the operation.[] The operation also led to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31 October by two of her Sikh bodyguards as an act of vengeance,[][][26] triggering the Sikh massacre.[] The widespread killing of Sikhs, principally in the national capital Delhi but also in other major cities in North India, led to major divisions between the Sikh community and the Indian Government. The army withdrew from Harmandir Sahib later in under pressure from Sikh demands.[] The bombing of Air India Flight is thought to have been a revenge action.
General Arun Shridhar Vaidya, the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation Blue Star, was assassinated in in Pune by two Sikhs, Harjinder Singh Jinda and Sukhdev Singh Sukha. Both were sentenced to death, and hanged on 7 October
In March , Sikh militants again occupied and continued to use the temple compound which necessitated another police action known as Operation Black Thunder on 1 May , Indian paramilitary police entered the temple and arrested militants that had occupied Harmandir Sahib for more than three months.[][7] On 2 May the paramilitary police undertook a hour operation to take control of Harmandir Sahib at Amritsar from several hundred militants, but almost all the major radical leaders managed to escape.[] In June , the Indian government ordered the area surrounding the temple to be vacated by local residents in order to prevent militants activity around the temple.[]
In the aftermath of Operation Blue Star, mutinies by Sikh soldiers, mostly raw recruits, were reported from different places. On 7 June, six hundred soldiers of the 9th Battalion of the Sikh Regiment, almost the entire other ranks' strength, mutinied in Sri Ganganagar. While some managed to escape to Pakistan, most were rounded up by men of the Rajputana Rifles. The largest mutiny took place in the Sikh Regimental Centre at Ramgarh, in Bihar, where recruits for the Sikh Regiment are trained. There, 1, soldiers—1, of them raw recruits, stormed the armoury, killing one officer and injuring two before they set out for Amritsar. The leaders of the mutiny divided the troops into two groups just outside of Banaras to avoid a rumoured roadblock. One half was engaged by army artillery at Shakteshgarh railway station; those who managed to escape were rounded up by the 21st Mechanised Infantry Regiment. The other half engaged with the artillery and troops of the 20th Infantry Brigade, during which 35 soldiers, of both sides, were killed.[][][63]:&#;&#; There were five smaller mutinies in different parts of India. In total 55 mutineers were killed and 2, were captured alive.[][]
The captured mutineers were court-martialed, despite efforts by various groups including retired Sikh officers to get them reinstated.[63]:&#;&#; In August , of the 2, mutineers were rehabilitated by the Central government as part of the Rajiv–Longowal Accord.[]